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Abstract A fundamental shift in the future of work is under-
way, with significant implications for the number, location, and
types of jobs. This shift is entangled in a wider set of longer-
term transitions. The disruptive nature of this shift presents new
policy challenges and carries implications for maintaining the
social contract. This paper shares recent examples of global
Foresight that have been developed by the OECD to help na-
tional governments to appreciate and prepare for this shift, both
individually and via international cooperation. Despite the po-
tential value of using Strategic Foresight methods, a scarcity of
strategic conversation at the international level is a key con-
straint in preparing whole societies for this shift.
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1 Introduction: a crisis in jobs or something
completely different?
In recent decades, economic globalisation has created millions
of new jobs, lifted billions more out of poverty, and led to
unprecedented capital wealth. Globalisation has also increased
global competition for talent and skills and resulted in the
offshoring of jobs – a relocation of manufacturing from the
higher-waged, advanced industrialised economies to lower
labour-cost countries. Downward pressure on wages has also
increased with the flow of economic migrants.
Today, the future of work is unclear. Increasing connectiv-
ity has become a key driver of value and vulnerability. The
world has entered an era of faster, more volatile, more turbu-
lent and less predictable change.
On the one hand, the future of work is shaped by the eco-
nomic turmoil that has occurred following the 2008 great finan-
cial crisis. The 2008 crisis has exposed the unsustainable, multi-
way linkages between the financial services sector, the real
economy, wider society and the earth’s natural life support sys-
tems. For instance, income inequality in OECD countries is at
its highest level for the past half century. The average income of
the richest 10 % of the population is now about nine times that
of the poorest 10 % across the OECD, up from seven times
25 years ago [1]. This development is exemplified by pay
cheques to CEOs of multinational companies, which are many
thousand times higher than those of average workers. This pat-
tern of greater extremes in income inequality raises new ques-
tions about what it means to Bfix^ the crisis and how to kick-
start a more inclusive era of global growth and prosperity.
On the other hand, the so-called Digital Revolution, which
started in the 1970s, is gaining pace. Similar to the
Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions, it is destroying less-
skilled jobs and creating new opportunities for higher skilled
and self-generated work, for example, the rise of the freelancer
or gig economy. It also increases existing policy concerns
about technology skills gaps, and the rise in long-term and
youth unemployment.
This new technological and geopolitical reality is unprece-
dented. It opens up new possibilities for technological leap-
frogs and redirects attention from education for jobs to non-
cognitive and entrepreneurial skills, life-long learning, and re-
skilling. It promises massive opportunities in self-generated
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work, including for women and youth. It is also contributing
to a heightened sense of job insecurity, and the prospect of an
increasing shortfall in decent, well-paid jobs for all. This shift
raises uncomfortable questions about the sustainability of the
social contract in all kinds of economies, from advanced to
developing. It also raises fundamental questions about what it
means to Bwork,^ the metric of Bpaid jobs,^ the goal of full
employment as well as the emphasis on income inequality,
which has moved to centre stage in the social contact between
liberal democratic market states and their citizens.
A fundamental shift in the future of work is underway, with
significant implications for the number, location, and types of
jobs. This shift is entangled in awider context – a complex inter-
play of technological, economic, social, and environmental
changes. It is also shaped by the interactions of a more diverse
landscape of old and new actors –West and East – a rise in the
powerofnon-stateactorsanda lessbenignmultipolargeo-polity.
Although longer-term developments are impossible to pre-
dict, societies can prepare for the inevitable shift in the future
of work. This paper shares examples of recent global
Foresight that has been developed by the OECD to help na-
tional governments to appreciate and prepare for this shift,
both individually and via international cooperation. Despite
the potential value of using Strategic Foresight methods, a
scarcity of strategic conversation at the international level is
a key constraint in preparing whole societies for this shift.
BMeasurable changes^ section discusses how it is possible
to compliment and challenge conventional policy analysis that
focusses on the facts about the past, with Strategic Foresight
methods that reveal, test and contest assumptions about the
future. This in turn enables more futures knowledge to be used
to identify and consider new and better policy solutions for
dealing with the emerging threats and opportunities implied
by the shift in the future of work.
BUsing foresight to prepare for the shift in the future of
work^ section provides examples of how the OECD is using
Strategic Foresight approaches to enable flexible framing of
the new threats and opportunities of the shift in work and to
support more open and inclusive policy conversations about
necessary changes in structural policies.
BDiscussion and conclusions^ section discusses the multi-
ple barriers – cognitive, cultural, behavioural, and institutional
– that are encountered in using Strategic Foresight methods to
guide policymaking. It highlights how the current scarcity of
strategic conversation at the international level prevents new
idealism of universal development from becoming a deeper
realism.
2 Measurable changes
Conventional approaches to policymaking assume a stable
and predictable world and use frequency theory to know the
distant future by extrapolating statistically significant trends.
In this approach the Bbusiness-as-usual^ future is presented in
the form of a probability-based forecast or a non-probabilistic,
conditional projection.
This conventional forecast-based planning uses macro-
economic models to calculate the distant future in terms of
wages, inflation, (un-)employment rates as well as the num-
bers, levels, and locations of jobs. Such models are developed
to guide progressive structural policies in order to achieve
goals such as full employment and higher wages.
The use of mathematical tools for analysis has become
easier in recent decades due to the abundance of data and
access to cheaper and faster computing power. A good exam-
ple of these computer-basedmodelling approaches to strategic
threat assessment is provided by recent OECD Employment
and Economic Outlooks.
2.1 OECD business-as-usual outlooks
Trends in unemployment, long-term unemployment, youth
unemployment, underemployment and technological skills
biases have been long-standing concerns in many OECD
countries for many decades. For example, in the first quarter
of 2014, one in three unemployed people in OECD countries
had been out of work for 12 months or more, almost twice the
number in 2007 [2, 3]. More than half the adults in OECD
countries do not have the skills to fulfil simple problem-
solving tasks in technology-rich environments [4]. Estimates
based on the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) show
that on average, 9 % of jobs are at high risk of automation,
while for another 25 %, half of the tasks will change signifi-
cantly because of automation [5].
The most recent OECD Economic Outlook [6] offers the
business-as-usual perspective that assumes continuity of to-
day’s trends. The story created by looking across different sets
of data is that a serious slowdown in growth and job creation
has occurred following the 2008 global financial crisis. Global
growth rates have fallen significantly since 2008, averaging
just 1.7 % in the OECD over the last six years compared to
2.7%in the 15 years before the crisis. World trade growth has
halved following the financial crisis. Advanced economies
appear to be stuck in a low-growth trap, wherein diminished
expectations about future demand growth become self-
fulfilling as investment remains subdued even in the face of
record-low interest rates. Weak investment growth holds back
capital deepening and hinders productivity growth. World
trade growth since the crisis has slowed even more sharply
among emerging market economies, with some of them fall-
ing into prolonged recession. A mix of structural and cyclical
factors is implicated in this slowdown and low-growth trap.
Based on the current trajectory, the OECD offers a business-
as-usual estimate that it will take 70 years, instead of 35, to
double living standards across the advanced economies.
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2.1.1 The challenge of enabling full employment in the Indian
economy
The future of work outlook for non-OECD economies is simi-
larly challenging. For example, in 2016, the unemployment rate
in India is 5.0 % and is projected to increase to 7.5 % in 2017
[7]. Assuming 7–8% annual growth and based on demographic
projections, the economy will need to add over 80 million net
new job seekers each year. At current rates only 30 million net
new jobs –mostly informal and low-wage ones –will be created
[8]. This leaves a gap of about 50 million jobs a year over the
next ten years. In response to the Bbusiness-as-usual^ outlook,
Indian Prime Minister Modi has set some very ambitious goals,
which include transforming the subcontinent into a Bglobal
manufacturing hub^ [8] with the aim of creating 100 million
jobs in the next six years and spurring the development of a
middle class that can power the Indian economy for years to
come. But the question remains: how can this shift in the na-
tional development pathway be achieved? After all, between
2005 and 2012, India’s GDP growth was 54 %, but its net job
growth was only 3 % - about 15 million net new jobs.
2.2 Qualitative assumptions
Such robust econometric projections treat technological devel-
opment as a black box. The assumption is that new technolog-
ical developments, similar to those of the industrial era will
contribute to economic growth, enhance productivity and create
more and higher skilled jobs in the long run.Whether or not this
remains true in the future depends on assumptions about the
future of technology which are of a more qualitative nature.
2.2.1 Diverging perspectives on technology as usual
Present-day outlooks about the implications of new and accel-
erating technology developments for jobs differ significantly,
presenting stories of hope and horror often reflecting the hype
of technological determinism, a perspective which assumes
technological developments will dictate the nature and pace
of social change and not the other way around.
Storyline 1: Secular stagnation: displaced by machines A
combination of factors concerning the productivity levels is
based on a long-term historical argument [9]. Therefore, the
digital revolution is characterised by the widespread uptake of
industrial robots, which accelerates technological joblessness
and marks the end of an era of permanent, paid jobs. One
study suggests that 47 % of US’ employment is subject to
substitution by technology; 39 % of Germany’s employment;
and 35 % of UK’s employment [10]. The key policy issue
becomes managing social cohesion in the context of fewer
jobs and more extreme inequality under conditions of eco-
nomic contraction.
Storyline 2: New renaissance: machine-augmented There’s
never been a better time to be a worker with special skills or
the right education, because these people can use technology
to create and capture value. However, there’s never been a
worse time to be a worker with only ‘ordinary’ skills and
abilities to offer, because computers, robots and other digital
technologies are acquiring these skills and abilities at an ex-
traordinary rate [11]. The alternative perspective is that the
accelerating convergence of digital and biotechnologies, with
some level of artificial intelligence, will augment human cre-
ativity and labour. Machines will do the all the boring, dirty,
and unsafe work. There will be more and different opportuni-
ties for everyone to create value and to contribute to society.
2.2.2 Rethinking the society-as-usual outlook
For most of human history neither paid jobs nor decent work
existed. In the last century women managed to have meaning-
ful work without paid jobs, until one-earner families were no
longer viable, and homemaking/child-raising/volunteering/
caretaking was not considered meaningful work. A future
without paid jobs or meaningful work is, in one sense not a
new paradigm for half the population – just for men.
Today the terms Bjobs^ and Bwork^ appear interchange-
able. This was not always the case. For the first time in de-
cades the outlook for jobs and the future of work are not the
same thing. The fundamental shift in the future of work cannot
be fully understood by using the metrics and models that were
developed for the job-centric industrial era. Instead, new
threats and opportunities can be better anticipated by looking
beyond the facts to engage wider and deeper assumptions that
operate as strategic framing devices that shape understanding
of the present situation whether or not they are made explicit,
or remain implicit.
Without attention to these deeper, and often deeply held,
assumptions, informed debates about the future of work can
quickly become polarised between all-good versus all-bad
stories of the future. For example:
& An impending crisis in jobs due to the rise of robots versus
the irresistible rise of the digital economy and the prospect
of safer, more interesting work for anyone.
& The inevitable leapfrog of developing and emerging econ-
omies versus the inevitable secular stagnation of ageing
societies.
2.3 Working with testable and contestable assumptions,
not facts
Differences in experts’ interpretation of data reflect different
assumptions about the way the world works and/or should
work and what will happen next. In effect, in the absence of
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any direct experience of the future, expert judgement reflects
assumptions about the future that are often deeply held and
difficult to reveal, test, and contest in the same way as data can
be used to verify facts. Since facts are always of the past rather
than the future, such differences in informed perspective can-
not be easily resolved by simply using more data.
This presents a conundrum to the evidence-based policy
system: How to overcome the polarised perspectives offered
by expert interpretation of data, even as more and more data is
available and how to develop useful and useable sources of
futures knowledge? At the same time, policy making cannot
simply ignore the existing evidence base or it will run the risk
of policy-based evidence, that is, ideologically driven policy
ineffectiveness.
By paying attention to alternative stories of the future of
work – stories that are already emerging in the present – it is
possible to test and contest qualitative assumptions and to
engage with strategic frames that would otherwise remain im-
plicit and unchallenged. By working with narratives and num-
bers and iterating between stories, qualitative systems think-
ing and quantitative systems modelling, it is possible to devel-
op a more flexible, shared and systemic understanding of the
fundamental shift in the future of work.
3 Using foresight to prepare for the shift in the future
of work
According to UNIDO, Technology Foresight Bprovides inputs
for the formulation of technology policies and strategies that
guide the development of the technological infrastructure^
[12]. Associated methods take a technology-centric view that
focusses on predicting the most likely technological develop-
ments in the mid-term future. They can be augmented by
Strategic Foresight methods. Strategic Foresight centres on
the future from the perspectives of a specific group, commu-
nity, firm, government or society. The emphasis is not on
technology push or pull per se, but on the challenge of devel-
oping and using different types of futures knowledge to inter-
vene in puzzling and potentially turbulent situations that are
characterised by social ambiguity and systems complexity.
The aim is to test and/or develop strategic options that
enhance the resilience of a specified socio-technological sys-
tem. Strategic Foresight methods engage a diversity of
disciplinary- and situated-perspectives and create a safe space
to reveal, test and constructively contest assumptions and en-
able consideration of less familiar future possibilities. The aim
is not prediction but better preparedness.
In recent years at the OECD, four different Strategic
Foresight methodologies have been used to explore, navigate,
and prepare for the shift in the future of work. The Bwhat for^
or Bso what^ of eachmethod is described in the following four
sections.
3.1 OECD meta-scanning: mapping the contours
of the next production revolution
To prepare for unpredictable and potentially disruptive
change, it is necessary to look beyond the continuation of
statistically strong trends and identify trend bends and
breaks, the start of new trends that are already emerging in
the present. This is enabled through scanning the horizon,
that is, looking beyond the usual timeframe of decision-
making and beyond the extrapolation of today’s trends that
are relevant when using a strategic frame of full employment
and paid jobs.
In 2014, the OECD Strategic Foresight unit piloted a glob-
ally, wide and deep horizon scan of multiple sources of data (a
meta-scan) to help frame and inform a new strategic and hor-
izontal work programme on the Next Production Revolution.
The meta-scan inputs were three-fold: (1) Targeted search for
recently published (within 5 years) Foresight reports by mem-
ber and partner governments; (2) An extensive search of aca-
demic databases; (3) An open scan of internet sources and
social media.
The targeted search revealed the globally common and dif-
ferent national emphasis that is being placed on emerging
technologies. For example, robotics, nano- and biotechnology
dominate literature about technologies, accounting for 38 %,
32 %, and 25 %, respectively, of articles. One quarter of all
results originated from the United States, with China account-
ing for 11 %. Other leading countries (in order) were Japan,
Germany, the UK, South Korea, France, Italy, India, and
Canada. More articles about the Internet of Things, however,
came from China than from anywhere else, with the USA
leading on the other three technologies.
The open scan was produced in collaboration with the firm
Polecat, which used its proprietary platform (Meaning Mine),
which tracksmillions of sources of unstructured data each day,
including online national and local news, blogs, forums, trade
publications, consumer reviews, press wires as well as corpo-
rate, government and academic publications from over 180
countries. The open scan included all online and social media
in English over 90 days and covered Big Data, Internet of
Things, 3D printing, nanotech, robotics and industrial
biotechnology.
The headline results were as follows:
& Healthcare impacts dominate online and social media,
followed by robotics and jobs.
& Online media coverage of all technologies was more pos-
itive than social media.
& Environmental impacts tend to be less visible, save for
industrial biotechnology.
& Corporate involvement is cross-sectoral: aeronautics, au-
tomobiles, banking, consumer goods, crop science, ICT,
lifestyle, oil and gas, and pharmaceuticals.
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& The significance of these technologies and the perception
of benefits and threats vary on a regional basis.
Combining the targeted search and scan elements and using
data mining of the results of both enables policymakers to
better avoid the trap of technological determinism and to at-
tend to the social pull factors of new technology develop-
ments. In the pilot meta-scan the combination of technological
push and social pull factors was concentrated in five challenge
themes (Fig. 1)
By looking beyond individual national perspectives and
across multiple policy domains, the meta-scan directs atten-
tion to new themes and global connections that are relevant in
preparing societies for the shift in the future of work. Horizon
scanning can also be facilitated by using a megatrends frame-
work that helps facilitate shared and faster sense-making of
new and different stories, signals, and novel developments.
3.2 OECD megatrends analysis
Megatrends are not single trends but an analysis of the pattern
shifts that will result from the interplay of multiple trends.
OECD megatrends analysis is used to set the scene for high-
level policy meetings. An OECDmegatrends analysis enables
a shared view of the shifting global strategic landscape and
can be used to support interactive and generative policy dia-
logues on a wide range of existing and emerging challenges.
The OECD megatrends framework was established in 2012
and is organised around four broad categories, namely People,
Planet, Productivity and Polity. A fifth cross-cutting theme –
Progress – can be added if horizon scanning involves attention
to new and different narratives of progress and an analysis of
underlying myths. These broad categories act as lenses that
focus on different parts of the vast future landscape in order to
enable new insights about interacting trends. Each category also
operates as a bridge that links synthesis across policy silos and
different national perspectives. For example, demographic age-
ing is an established megatrend in many OECD countries. By
2050, the number of people aged 65 years and older will have
tripled. Meanwhile the percentage of the population aged
16 years and under is shrinking. Demographic ageing has
emerged from a combination of improvements in health, wel-
fare andwork. It carries significant implications for the future of
work – an ageing workforce, the sustainability of pensions, etc.
However, a demographic shift is not the only People-
category related megatrend that needs to be considered, espe-
cially in facilitating global economic cooperation and devel-
opment. In addition to demographic ageing in OECD coun-
tries and China, the OECD People megatrend lens identifies
other people-related pattern shifts:
& Youth bulges are emerging in many non-OECD countries,
i.e. the majority of the population aged less than 16 years
can be found in some of the fastest growing populations,
e.g., Indonesia, and, Nigeria.
Fig. 1 Visualisation of the OECD Meta-Scan on the Next Production Revolution. Source: Strategic Foresight Unit, OECD
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& Rapid urbanisation in many emerging economies, contrasts
with peaking of urban populations in cities in some OECD
countries. By 2020, most of the world’s top 20 megacities
will be located in non-OECD countries, and therewill be 500
new mid-sized cities (1 million-plus inhabitants) in China.
& Increasing pressure for and new patterns of migration –
globalisation has reduced income inequality between coun-
tries yet even modest wage differentials drive economic
migration. Unprecedented waves of people-movement are
occurring in different world regions – within Asia-Pacific,
between Central and North America, between the Middle
East and Europe. More lone children and families are
forced to relocate due to war, extended conflict and food-
and water-related environmental crisis (famine, flooding).
& Connectedness – the rapid increase in the use of social
media as evident in the widespread use of Facebook,
Twitter, etc. More people in Africa now have a mobile
phone than access to electrical grids. Even so, four billion
people worldwide are not yet online.
In effect, the People lens redirects attention from the focus
on ageing societies that has characterised international policy
discussions on the future of work in the past, to addressing the
new phenomenon of more globally connected and demo-
graphically diverse societies.
Similarly, the OECD Productivity lens encourages attention
to new signals of change relating to developments in education,
skills and technology (digital and other). For example:
& In recent years, there has been an intensified polarisation
of today’s workforce between highly-skilled, well-paid
jobs and lower-paid, low-skilled ones even as the share
of the low-educated has been contracting across all major
occupational groups [12].
& Technology developments that augment human labour
and cognitive skills and create new types of work, e.g., a
Bmicro-facturing revolution^ enabled by 3D printing,
machine-machine learning, and the development of gen-
eralised artificial intelligence.
& The rise of the shared (or peer-to-peer) economy enables
individuals to leverage their skills and assets (e.g., cars).
As a result, there are new opportunities for self-generated
work including for women and youth, at least for those
with some assets.
& Driverless cars, drones delivering goods, and algorithms
replacing accountants, bank staff, and legal assistants have
led some to suggest that automation will result in a net loss
of more than 5.1 million jobs across 15 major advanced
economies [13].
Looking slightly further forward, the digital revolution is
accelerating a pattern of technological convergence.
Digitalisation is not happening in isolation but in interaction
with other technology fields (nanotech, biotech, ICT, genetics,
robotics, and artificial intelligence). This is creating a new reality
- decentralised, pervasive, embedded and active – Bliving^ –
technologies, and the prospect of an Internet of Everything,
machine-machine learning and robotic innovation. The nature
and timing of the next productivity revolution are uncertain and
dependent on assumptions about the speed and inevitability of
the transition from the industrial to digital knowledge economy.
The future of work is also shaped by developments in fi-
nance, business and trade. For example:
& The long-term costs of capital and continuation of zero
and low interest rates;
& The uneven uptake of new technologies by firms and the
staff-light business models of the new internet business
giants;
& In addition to the reduction in world trade since 2008,
there is a shift in what is being traded from manufactured
products to intermediaries (e.g., software) and services.
Could the current slow progress in international trade
rounds, which are focussed on the liberalisation of ser-
vices, soon be outpaced by digital disruption of what will
be traded in future? If so, where and by whom?
3.2.1 Megatrends crashing – navigating demographic
diversity and new productivity dividends
In addition to considering the implications of developments
within each megatrends category for the future of work, new
threats and opportunities can be anticipated by combining
megatrend categories - e.g., People and Productivity. This
enables, in turn, different global perspectives concerning the
shift in the future of work to be discovered and considered and
avoids the trap of imposing a Bone size fits all^ global blue-
print. For example, emerging economies are rethinking demo-
graphic dividends in the context of digital divides, and ad-
vanced industrialised economies are grappling with the digital
dividend in the context of rapidly ageing societies.
3.3 Scenario planning – exploring alternative futures
3.3.1 OECD futures of livelihoods
In 2014, the OECD Development Centre in collaboration with
The Rockefeller Foundation embarked on a scenario-based pro-
ject called BSecuring livelihoods for all: Foresight for action.^
This initiative was motivated by two shared challenges:
1. To develop inclusive economies that would enable the
poorest and most vulnerable to access global opportunities.
2. To create secure livelihoods that enable individuals, fam-
ilies and communities not just to survive but to thrive in
the face of emerging threats.
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The scenario planning framework was developed during a
four-day workshop held at The Rockefeller Foundation’s
Bellagio Centre in August 2014, which gathered an expert
group of entrepreneurs, scholars, policymakers and non-
profit leaders to discuss the future of livelihoods. The work-
shop was co-organised by The Economist Intelligence Unit
and the OECD Development Centre as part of The
Rockefeller Foundation’s Visionaries Unbound series.
Four sketch scenarios emerged from workshop discus-
sions, developed around two axes that represented key uncer-
tainties in terms of the following questions: (1) BWill the fu-
ture of livelihoods be determined by large-scale solutions? Or
by solutions at the local level, especially cities?^ (2) BWill the
future of livelihoods be focused primarily on getting policies
right? Or, by becoming more effective in the developing of
individuals for a new work world?^
Nets – the financial economy Jobless growth is accepted as a
facet of late-stage capitalism, and policymakers look to social
safety nets to assure livelihoods for all. There is increasing
interest in radical redistribution policies – including
restructuring of domestic tax systems to enable a shift from
income to consumption and wealth taxes and piloting of new
systems involving Basic Income Guarantees.
Pathways – the knowledge economy The knowledge econ-
omy grows, so there are plenty of jobs – but they all require
education and training. There’s a mismatch between jobs and
education, which governments and cities struggle to correct.
There is much more focus on re-training of older workers and
helping young people get the necessary skills and guidance.
Portfolios – the experience economy Young people are no
longer interested in jobs so much as meaningful work, work-
life cycle balance, and portfolio careers. Entrepreneurs sell
their services, skills, and produce directly to global markets,
on e-bay and through Alibaba. Dematerialisation accelerates
in advanced industrial societies but with an increase in global
tourism, due to the growing focus on an experience economy
by global connected urban elites.
Green world – the green economy Nations make large and
serious commitments to building low carbon and digital econ-
omy infrastructures – creating jobs at all levels in a way sim-
ilar to the rebuilding efforts after World War II that made
formerly devastated countries (Japan, Germany) among the
most prosperous.
The four scenarios offer different possible futures from the
one currently being forecast. They do not depend on miracles
of global governance. But they do depend on a shift in em-
phasis by policymakers from an exclusive focus on GDP
growth to one that also takes into account the multidimension-
al well being of people. These four sketch scenarios continued
to be developed through an iterative process of storytelling,
systems thinking, and quantitative analysis involving engage-
ment with wider OECD experts. The final set of five scenarios
explicitly reflected financial and environmental shocks and
were used by policy analysts to identify policy implications
at the global, national, and local level for the future of liveli-
hoods under very different circumstances [14].
3.3.2 OECD ministerial committee meeting: futures
of investments and jobs
Another example of using a scenario-based Foresight inter-
vention to anticipate the shift in the future of work centres
on the preparation for an informal and interactive scenario-
based policy discussion session about the direction of national
policies aimed at unlocking investment for sustainable growth
and jobs, which took place during the first lunch of the
OECD’s annual Ministerial Council Meeting in June 2015.
Three global archetype scenarios were identified by the
OECD secretariat based on an expansive review of global
scenarios published by governments and businesses. These
were further developed through engagement with national
Foresight experts and fine-tuned via an extensive prototyping
of the interactive discussion process involving OECD ambas-
sadors and delegation staff.
The three global archetype scenarios present alternative
future policy contexts that might happen to OECD member
countries and partners, independently of what they – or the
OECD as an organisation - think should happen.
A brief description of each of these three archetype scenar-
ios is presented in the remainder of this section together with
the implications of each for the future of work.
Quick fixes Globalisation continues with faster incre-
mental policy adjustments enabled by
greater transparency and data abundance.
InQuick Fixes, policymakers scramble to balance the need
for more flexible labour markets with the need to avoid more
extreme income and wealth inequalities. Jobless growth is
increasingly accepted as a facet of late-stage capitalism, and
policymakers look to radical redistribution mechanism, in-
cluding high wealth taxation to enable investment in liveli-
hoods for all. In a world of digitally empowered but increas-
ingly fragmented and polarised societies, implementation of
new policy experiments centred in the concept of Buniversal
basic income^ is delayed until after 2025. Many young people
in mature industrial economies are no longer interested in
lifelong jobs so much as meaningful work, work-life cycle
balance, and portfolio careers. As more and more entrepre-
neurs sell their commodities online from developing, emerg-
ing and advanced economies, policy makers are faced with a
new challenge that not everyone wants or can be an
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entrepreneur. By 2030 two billion are employed, two billion
are self-employed, one billion are in the informal economy,
one billion are unemployed or in transition, and two-and-a-
half billion people are not part of the workforce (children,
retirees, people with disabilities).
Multipolar The global order is starting to fragment, as
regional agreements proliferate and groups
of countries choose different technology and
regulatory pathways in pursuit of growth
and well-being.
In Multipolar, the opportunities of low interest rates and
more diverse sources of private credit enables government-
directed investment to be targeted at job creation in new
Bsunrise industries^ that meet shifting social needs and are
acceptable from the perspective of ethics and cultural values.
Nations make large and serious commitments to building the
new ‘clicks-and-bricks’ infrastructure that is needed to sup-
port new innovation ecosystems, at regional and national
scale. This creates jobs at all levels in a way similar to the
rebuilding efforts after World War II that made formerly dev-
astated countries (Japan, Germany) among the most prosper-
ous. As national economies start to grow again, there are plen-
ty of jobs – and they all require broader skills. Cognitive
enhancements andmachine-augmentation of humans are care-
fully regulated to avoid new social gaps and divides. There is
growing conviction that there are more jobs available than
there are skilled people to fill them. Education systems rapidly
transform to meet the challenges of learning for life and life-
long learning.
City power Globally connected cities compete with one
another to attract the best talent and the
most successful corporations from around
the world. More dynamic cooperation be-
tween cities, businesses and governments
enables new solutions to emerging global
challenges such as climate change adapta-
tion, robotic innovation, cyber-security, and
increasing migration.
In City Power, new technologies stimulate more self-
generated work opportunities, and 3D-printing results in a re-
shoring of work. As successful cities increasingly attract global
investment in smarter, integrated and urban-scale food-water-
energy systems, livelihood policies are developed at the city
level and aligned with new national frameworks that support
managed migration, global cyber security and mega-regional
trade systems. Companies outsource work in discrete projects,
so workers may sometimes be working at a couple of projects
followed by a period during which they have no employment.
In an era of robotic innovation, monopolies of knowledge are a
continuous problem as fewer companies register patents.
National governments learn to regulate new types of self-
generated work, to provide incentives for the use of private data
for public goods and to develop new frameworks for measuring
contributions to society beyond income generation.
These scenarios do not directly provide solutions but, as a
set, helped to highlight new questions for discussion that are
relevant to a more anticipatory global policy agenda on the
future of work, for example:
& What new metrics of productivity are needed in a jobs-
scarce economy?
& If the best opportunities for unlocking investment for sus-
tainable growth occur at a regional or city level, what new
global governance arrangements will be needed?
& How can the global knowledge commons be safeguarded
an era of private data and robotic innovation?
3.4 Visioning and back-casting - translating universal
development into actionable policies
A new global vision of universal development in which no
one is left behind has been agreed and is underpinned by the
UN agenda on 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Translating this vision into action is the task of national
governments. Several OECD governments have started to re-
view and align existing national development strategies or to
create new ones that will enable them to meet and demonstrate
that they are meeting their new international commitments.
Central to these efforts is a whole-of-government agenda
that anticipates how the shift in the future of work is being
shaped by the complex interplay of global and domestic factors
and national policy choices. To support its members’ efforts,
the OECD, in turn, has developed more integrated methodolo-
gies that combine conventional policy analysis, Strategic
Foresight methods, and multidimensional measurement frame-
works. These new integrated methodologies are not confined to
OECD members but include the Multi-Dimensional Country
Review process for use in developing countries.
An example of how progress on commitments to the new
global vision of universal development manifests in implica-
tions for the national policy agenda on the future of work is
provided by Slovenia. Slovenia is in the process of preparing
the National Development Strategy 2030 in accordance with
its Vision 2050. Both the vision and the strategy are being
created with a focus on implementation of the UN Agenda
2030 for Sustainable Development.
The Slovenia Vision 2050 was developed through a partic-
ipatory Foresight process to ensure a whole-of-society vision
and drew on range of initial analytical inputs about the domes-
tic situation, outlook and shifting global context. To provide
relevant inputs, the Slovenian government asked the OECD to
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produce an independent comprehensive assessment of the cur-
rent situation, which included a comprehensive analysis of
key domestic trends and comparative international perfor-
mance. It was supplemented by an analysis of megatrends,
global and regional scenarios, and disruptors.
The drafting of the final vision statement continued
through several rounds of dialogue with key policy shapers
and wider stakeholders in government, Parliament, busi-
nesses, and the wider society. The new national vision does
not focus on the future of paid jobs per se, but describes a new
inclusive value-creation system that can sustain peace and
shared prosperity in the shift from an industrial to a
knowledge-based society. The motivating nature of the vision
generates new social energy and supports multiple strategic
conversations within and between different key stakeholders
in the government, Parliament, business and wider society that
brings together issues of jobs, self-generated work, and chal-
lenges of pensions and immigration, in a way that supports a
generational value shift in a highly educated society: a move
away from a jobs-for-life culture to choices that enable more
contributions to society and better work-life cycle balance.
For example, the vision recognizes the importance of en-
abling a transformation in education - a redesign of the system
and curriculum - to enable skills for life for all of society rather
than education for jobs per se. Skills for life, in turn, involve
cognitive and non-cognitive elements and contribute to crea-
tive problem solving, entrepreneurship, and active citizenry.
Furthermore, the vision opens up the space for a policy dia-
logue on labour market flexibility from the perspective of the
worker rather than the employer.
What is becoming clear in moving from visioning to action
is that navigating the shift in the future of work is a cross-
cutting agenda, not limited to the ministry of education or
social policies but benefitting from engagement of other min-
istries and policy domains.
Translating the vision into coherent policies that are linked
to budget and performance cycles has also exposed the lack of
whole-of-government capacity, which is common in the
stove-piped silos of bureaucratic and hierarchically organised
national governments. New mechanisms for horizontal coop-
eration are being progressed that use the Vision 2050 and
Strategy 2030 as a safe space to cultivate the Bpeople
coherence^ that is necessary for progressing a whole-of-
society vision through a whole-of-government agenda that
anticipates a fundamental shift in the future of work.
4 Discussion and conclusions
4.1 Preparing for – not predicting – the shift in work
A fundamental shift in the future of work is occurring, which
can be characterised as the end of the era of full employment
and paid jobs and the start of a technologically enabled era of
self-generated work. This shift is not determined by technol-
ogy per se but is shaped by the value, choices, and interaction
of a diversity of social actors and wider factors. It is entangled
in a wider context of global shifts.
Whether or not the future of work is good, bad, or ugly is
impossible to predict and difficult to discuss. It surfaces un-
comfortable questions about the present situation – for exam-
ple, the relevance of paid jobs as a key unit of analysis or the
validity of existing macro-economic models that were de-
signed for an era of full employment.
Many of the contours of the still emerging Bjobs-scarce
economy^ and the Bself-generated work society^ are not yet
visible. Detection of the new, emerging contours of the future
of work benefits from attention to the framing of relevant
trends and data. This framing inevitably reflects deeply held
assumptions about the future. Assumptions about the future
are inherent in understanding the present situation and hard to
reveal, test, and contest. A key challenge in policy-making is
not simply the absence of data about the future but the chal-
lenge of engaging assumptions and improving the quality of
inter-subjective judgements.
This shift cannot be fully anticipated, appreciated, or ad-
dressed by projecting the past into the future. Anticipating
fundamental changes in the number, nature, and location of
jobs and the new opportunities for machine-augmented and
self-generated work requires more imaginative, as well as in-
tegrated and inclusive policies. This can be achieved by
looking beyond the facts and engaging with assumptions.
Revealing, testing and contesting future assumptions can pro-
mote new, shared and more systemic policy learning.
As the examples provided in this paper indicated, new so-
lution spaces can be identified by using Strategic Foresight
methods to supplement conventional policy analysis. The
new solution spaces are often cross-cutting and identifying
and populating them benefits from strategic conversation,
not just more and better analysis.
For example, some of the emerging threats and opportuni-
ties of this fundamental shift involve managing skills gaps and
jobs scarcity in the context of a still accelerating pace of tech-
nological change, whilst avoiding a low growth trap. It will
benefit from bringing together expertise in trade, finance and
investment, and economic and social policy. It will require
courageous leadership to open up a higher quality strategic
conversation about radical redistribution mechanisms, sunrise
and sunset industries, the redesign of education systems, and
global migration.
In the absence of any predictive theory of evolution, stra-
tegic and other foresight methods offer a pragmatic toolkit that
can be used to navigate the messy multidimensional shift in
work and avoid the trap of framing the future in terms of the
repetition of history, conventional wisdom, and solutions that
worked in the past.
Eur J Futures Res (2016) 4: 12 Page 9 of 11 12
4.2 The need to overcome multiple barriers
The effective use of Foresight methods – whether the focus is
on technology- or organisational- focussed futures - is not a
simple matter of the substitution of old methods and tools for
new. There are multiple barriers to developing and using
Foresight to complement and challenge conversational policy
analysis on the future of work and significant problems in
assessing and evaluating impact.
4.2.1 Multiple barriers
To identify and overcome these barriers and problems, the
OECD started to convene an international community of se-
nior government Foresight champions and experienced prac-
titioners in 2013. The community network has grown rapidly
to include over 70 members from 23 OECD member states
and key partner countries. In additional to facilitating interna-
tional exchange of global- and governmental Foresight studies
the community is engaged in an exchange of Bstories of
success^ – real world examples of effective use and impact
of Strategic Foresight by governments. These cases include
the use of Foresight for many different purposes: national risk
assessment; development national security and development
strategies; engaging orphan issues (i.e. emerging policy chal-
lenges that fall between the silos); resetting research agendas;
enabling strategic early warning systems; building social cap-
ital; and, testing existing/designing new policies.
The community collaboration is enabled via a web-portal
and platform, as well as face-to-face working group meetings
and an annual conference.
To date, the OECD Government Foresight Community
(GFC) network has identified four types of barriers to the
development and use of Foresight – cognitive, cultural, behav-
ioural and institutional. Cognitive barriers include: spatial ho-
rizon (state/local centred, absolute notion of space); issue ho-
rizon (sectoral silos of regulatory responsibility); dynamic ho-
rizon (trend continuity); and, ethical horizon (policymaking as
rational project, bounded by invariable outputs). Cultural bar-
riers include: an inherent bias towards the short-term (political
myopia, presentist bias); and, drive for consensus/avoidance
of conflict. A key behavioural barrier is that there are incen-
tives for stepping up in crisis, but none for avoiding crises.
Institutional barriers include: lack of effective engagement
with gatekeepers in the policy briefing hierarchy (late involve-
ment, poor translation); no/limited whole-of-government net-
work capacity; skills in working with numbers and narratives,
in designing and facilitating strategic conversations, etc.
4.2.2 Assessing and evaluating impact
There is no scientific or widely agreed procedure for assessing
and evaluating the impact of Foresight in policy. After all, the
aim is not enable more accurate prediction but to enhance
preparedness. The assumption in developing and using
Foresight in policy making is that the future cannot be fully
predicted and thus all decision outcomes cannot be calculated
in advance. Added to this, of course, is the reality that the
actual process of policy-making in practice does not conform
to the idealised model of truth speaking to power i.e. there is a
challenge of using more evidence at the same time of needing
to look beyond the Bfacts^. Finally, cause-and-effect in
decision-making processes are complex. Foresight is one of
many inputs in a process that is shaped by different cultures of
decision making vary in terms of how a decision is made and
what constitutes a decision.
As a consequence, the GFC community continues to en-
gage with scholarship into the use and evaluation of Foresight,
including grounded theory that has been published to guide
effectiveness of scenario planning practices. It has noted that
similar theory for the effective use of mega-trends analysis
does not yet exist. This presents an opportunity for further
scholarship to support the continued evolution and effective-
ness of the development, use and impact of the diversity of
methodologies that characterise the practice-led field of
Foresight.
4.3 Strategic conversation at the international level
to move beyond idealism to deeper realism
Individual governments can better prepare societies for the
emerging job-scarce economy by developing and using global
foresight.
In an era still characterised by global economic integration
and interconnectedness, there are limits to the effectiveness of
national strategies in anticipating the shift in the future of work
and benefits in international collaboration. Collaborative ac-
tion at the international level needs to respect different per-
spectives and move beyond national interest. It benefits from
not only the exchange of national perspectives of the global
future but on the inclusive development and use of neutral
Global Foresight.
To prepare for a faster, fundamentally shifting, and more
interconnected world, which is increasingly global and local,
and shaped by actors within and beyond government, the
OECD is developing and using global foresight to get ahead
of emerging global policy challenges and enable anticipatory
global governance.
The concept of global Foresight is still in its infancy. It
requires a blending of strategic and technological foresight
approaches with conditional projection. Global futures knowl-
edge can be enabled by working with narratives and numbers
to test and contest facts and assumptions. Futures knowledge
is not the same as the fact-based knowledge enabled by reflec-
tion on past experience. It is never right, but nevertheless
useful.
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A good quality strategic conversation is required to gener-
ate, legitimise, and use global futures knowledge. A mix of
objectivity, creativity, and empathy is required to forge global
common ground and sustain new and more effective
collaboration.
Strategic conversation enables a more open, explicit,
shared, and flexible sense of future to be developed through
a process of interactive and immersive learning that takes
place in imagined future situations. Good conversation cannot
breathe in the ritualistic rain dances of governmental bureau-
cracy or international diplomacy or the point-and-counter
point debates of the academy. Nor can it flourish in the void
of competing global agenda of international organisations.
In preparing societies for a fundamental shift in the future
of work – and to get ahead of globally connected challenges
emerging from other global shifts – the challenge is to over-
come the polarised, incremental character of current debates
and enable a good quality strategic conversation that benefits
from the inclusive and collaborative development and use of
Global Foresight.
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